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Energy Restrictions to Growth: 













At  the  end  of  World  War  II,  Brazilian  authorities  perceived  energy  supply  as  a  major  constraint  to 
economic growth. To remove this constraint, state-owned energy companies (Petrobras and Eletrobras) 
were created to develop an energy system that should be able to supply the demand emerging from 
industrialization  and  urbanization,  operating  under  a  monopolistic  regulatory  regime.  This  regulatory 
regime was set up to face the elastic energy demand in the country.  In the 1980’s, this institutional 
arrangement was no longer able to match the growing demand of energy, especially in the power sector. 
Radical reforms were implemented to open the energy sector to private investors and to competition but 
power shortage restricted economic growth at the beginning of this decade. Reforms were introduced in 
the wholesale power market but the specter of a new shortage of energy supply is regularly haunting 
consumers,  especially  after  the  Brazilian  imports  of  energy  from  neighbor  countries  (Paraguay  and 
Bolivia) became a political issue. The recent discovery of large offshore oil fields, the large potential for 
hydropower and the leadership in the supply of ethanol offer an optimistic scenario for the Brazilian 
supply of energy. In addition, since the 1990´s, the energy demand elasticity has fallen to unity, easing 
energy restrictions to growth. However, to remove the specter of energy shortages it is crucial to put in 
place a regulatory regime that can be able to attract the substantial financial resources needed to develop 
the energy system.  
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Resumo 
Após a Segunda Guerra Mundial, o governo brasileiro identificou a oferta de energia como uma restrição 
fundamental ao crescimento econômico. Para removê-la, empresas estatais (Petrobras e Eletrobras) foram 
criadas com o objetivo de desenvolver um sistema energético capaz de atender a demanda decorrente dos 
processos  de  industrialização  e  urbanização.  O  regime  de  monopólio  era  justificado  pela  elevada 
elasticidade da demanda, que implicava em forte ampliação da infra-estrutura. Na década de 1990, esse 
arranjo  institucional,  principalmente  no  setor  elétrico,  se  mostrou  incapaz  de  necessidade  de 
investimentos apesar da redução da elasticidade da demanda. As reformas liberalizaram o setor energético 
brasileiro,  mas  o  racionamento  de  eletricidade  comprometeu  o  crescimento  econômico  no  início  da 
década  atual.    O  mercado  de  eletricidade  sofreu  novas  alterações,  mas  o  risco  de  desabastecimento 
energético  é  ainda  relevante,  especialmente  após  as  importações  de  energia  se  tornarem  um  assunto 
político. A recente descoberta de petróleo no pré-sal, o elevado potencial de hidreletricidade e a liderança 
no mercado de etanol oferecem um cenário otimista para o setor energético brasileiro. No entanto, para 
eliminar a ameaça de novas crises energéticas é crucial desenvolver um regime regulatório capaz de atrair 
os recursos financeiros necessários para aproveitar esse cenário. 
Palavras-chaves: Oferta de energia, crescimento econômico, regulação e elasticidade da demanda 
JEL: N76, O13,Q43. 
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1. Introduction  
 
It  is  widely  accepted  that  energy  is  a  critical  input  for  economic  and  social 
development (WEA, 2000). Energy is used in every sector of human activity, and data 
correlating energy and GDP indicates that energy consumption increases with economic 
growth. Unsurprisingly, the reliability of energy supply is a centre piece of economic 
development policies. Shortages in the supply of energy, like the ones experienced by 
the  Brazilian  economy  in  1974  and  1978  (oil),  1990/1991  (ethanol)  and  2001 
(electricity), have an abrupt impact on economic growth. 
Our paper looks at the relationship between economic growth and the energy 
system.  The  first  section  investigates  the  impacts  of  the  industrialization  and 
urbanization of the second half of the XX Century in the energy consumption in Brazil. 
We  provide  a  historic  overview  of  energy  supply  and  evaluate  the  growth  energy 
elasticity  for  the  first  time  in  the  Brazilian  literature  using  modern  econometric 
techniques. The second examines the possible contradiction of energy supply shortages 
in a resource rich environment over the coming years. This is the challenge that the 
current institutional and regulatory arrangements that were put in place to develop the 
domestic supply of energy needed to avoid the risk of energy shortages, to guarantee 
energy supply in the future has to focus.  
After the Second World War, Brazil experienced not only a significant economic 
growth,  but  also  a  remarkable  change  in  its  energy  system.  Over  the  period, 
industrialization  and  urbanization  drastically  changed  the  landscape  of  both  the 
Brazilian society and the energy sector. In 1950, 63.8% of the population was living in 
rural areas and industry was 24.1% of GDP. Nowadays, the rural population is only 
19.8% and industry 37.5 % of GDP (UN, 2007 and Baer, 2008). The change in the 
energy system was radical as well (see Figure 1). Wood, a non commercial energy 
source, was substituted for commercial fuels, and large companies developed a modern 
energy system that are able to supply modern energy sources to all urban areas of the 
country and to most of the rural areas as well. External dependency on oil was removed, 
as far as oil supply is concerned. And a national grid has integrated all country but the 
Amazon region. 
Two basic energy forms, power and fuel have been supplied at higher rates over 
time, from varying sources. While in the 1970´s electricity supply was guaranteed from 
the large hydro plants, at least in the South and Southeast regions, the country was 
dependent on foreign imports for its oil refined fuel needs. In the 1980´s such fuel needs 
for  transportation  were  eased  with  the  use  of  ethanol.  In  1986,  about  95%  of  all 
automobiles sold were ethanol powered (Anfavea, 2008). In the 1990´s oil production 
rose significantly, and in the 2000´s natural gas became an important non-renewable 
energy source. In non-renewable sources, ethanol output rose significantly, at increasing 
productivity rates, up to the point that there is excess supply (Sandalow, 2006). 
Nevertheless, the energy system had come under stress over the period. In the 
1970´s the oil shock led to significant gasoline and diesel rationing –or at least restricted 
access to. In 1990, changing relative prices of sugar and lack of internal support for 
ethanol production led to a shortage that shattered consumer confidence in this fuel. The 
same  hydroelectric  system  and  a  more  interconnected  grid  system  that  guaranteed 
power for larger and larger parts of the country over the 1980´s came to a near halt in its 
supply expansion in the 1990´s, leading to the 2001 power shortage in the face of below 
average rains (Oliveira, 2001).  3 
 
For the early XXI Century, the energy system in Brazil is at a cross road with 
significant  resources  at  its  disposal  for  the  first  time  in  its  history.  The  available 
resources come from large oil and natural gas proven reserves, including the recently 
discovered “pre-salt” (extremely deep water oil field) break-though. There is also large 
output at competitive prices in the form of ethanol from sugar-cane, a renewable energy 
resource. The electricity supply is consolidated, and based on a complementary system 
of thermal and hydraulic (and nuclear) plants, with thermal plants fired either on oil or 
natural gas.  
In short, the power shortage spectrum firmly set in the population´s mind, as put 
in  the  famous  carnival  song  from  1954  at  the  country´s  capital  and  largest  city, 
mentioned above has been reduced. But the euphoria over the energy non-renewable 
(oil and natural gas) and renewable (ethanol and hydropower) resources available has to 
be translated into actual energy supply. This is the challenge for the XXI Century for 
Brazil, a challenge that the 2001 power shortage is keen to expose. We discuss such 
challenges are discussed in the last part of the paper. 
 
 
2. The evolution of Energy Supply in Brazil, 1948-2008.  
 
The energy supply system changed significantly after the Second World War. 
Such changes in two complementary ways, namely, an institutional change perspective 
and a statistical perspective. 
 
2.1  Institutional overview 
During the last six decades, the Brazilian energy system has been struggling 
with the specter of energy shortages. In the 1950’s, the main source of energy used in 
the  country  (firewood)  was  unfitted  to  supply  the  demand  emerging  from 
industrialization and urbanization. To develop the supply commercial energy sources, 
government  build  up  an  institutional  arrangement  that  delegated  to  Petrobras  the 
monopolistic development of oil supply and to a set of monopolistic regional power 
companies, coordinated by Eletrobras, the development of electricity supply (de Melo, 
de Oliveira e de Araújo, 1994). 
Actually, the cornerstones for the development of a modern energy system in 
Brazil were laid in the 1930´s by the federal government. The Water Code and the 
Mining  Code  assigned  to  the  federal  government  the  property  rights  of  the  energy 
resources (Dias Leite, 1997). However, by the end of Second World War, amid a wave 
of  nationalizations  that  discouraged  foreign  investors,  Brazil  was  facing  large 
difficulties to supply a rapid increasing energy demand.  
A  consensus  emerged  between  nationalists  and  liberals  that  state  owned 
companies should control the energy sector. Petrobras, a federal government monopoly, 
was  created in  1954 to develop  the incipient oil market  while regional state-owned 
power companies were cretaed to develop the electricity market.  In 1962, the federal 
government created Eletrobras as a holding company to coordinate the regional power 
companies.
1  These state-owned enterprises operated with the mandate to spread the 
                                                           
1 Besides the nuclear power plants and the Brazilian share of Itaipu, Eletrobras had the control of the four 
regional  generation  and  transmission  companies  (Eletronorte,  Eletrosul,  Furnas  and  CHESF),  and 
minority shares in every other power company. 4 
 
supply  of  modern  energy  sources,  at  prices  that  would  foster  industrialization  (de 
Oliveira,  1977).  The  rationale  for  a  state  enterprise  was  to  guarantee  control  over 
resources, and to induce forward linkages and multiplicative effects over the economy.  
These state-owned companies used the large financial and regulatory incentives 
received  from  the  State  to  remove  the  critical  shortages  of  energy  supply  in  the 
industrializing and urbanizing regions of the country. Until the 1970’s, a period of rapid 
economic growth, regionally concentrated in the South-Southeast, was pursued with no 
major energy constraint in these two regions.  Shortages were still a problem in the 
North-Northeast where the hydraulic power supply was lower and the interstate power 
grid was incomplete.  
Passed its infancy, the 1970’s oil crisis headed the modern energy system of 
Brazil to new challenges. The brutal increase in both oil prices and international interest 
rates  disorganized  the  macroeconomic  fundamentals  of  the  country.  Government 
introduced radical measures to put the rampant inflation under control (Baer, 2007). The 
Brazilian  economy  entered  into  a  phase  of  low  growth  but  urbanization  kept  its 
momentum moving up energy consumption, although at lower pace. Energy companies 
had  to  develop  the  system  to  keep  supply  and  demand  balanced  but  their  financial 
situations were deteriorating as result of government control of energy prices.  
From the 1950´s until the 1990´s Petrobras is recognized as playing its role as 
inductor  of  the  Brazilian  infrastructure  and  base  manufacturing,  both  in  production, 
refinery  and  chemicals.  Yet,  by  the  1970´s  other  energy  sources  received  heavy 
government subsidies and incentives, to counteract the oil crisis effects, namely ethanol. 
Anhydrous  ethanol  was  used  as  an  anitcombustant  in  gasoline,  reducing  pollution 
emissions  from  led,  and  regular  ethanol  as  fuel  itself.  In  1986  about  90%  of  new 
automobiles sold were regular ethanol fuelled. Yet in 1990 there were shortages that 
shattered consumer confidence on ethanol supply. The shortages culprits are usually 
pointed as the changes in relative prices for sugar and domestic price controls. 
Indeed,  price  control  problems  were  wide  spread  in  the  sector.  Energy 
companies were not allowed to increase their prices tandem with their rapidly increasing 
costs. Moreover, government incentives to the energy introduced in the 1950’s were 
gradually  removed.  Inevitably,  the  financial  situation  of  the  energy  companies 
deteriorated, reducing their ability to develop the energy system. Investments, especially 
in the power sector dwindled, and eventually the specter of energy shortage reemerged 
in the 1990’s (de Oliveira, 2007). To move forward the development of the energy 
system radical reforms were introduced in its regulatory and institutional arrangement. 
Privatization and competition were used to attract private investors to the energy system 
and to remove economic inefficiencies.  
The early reforms of the 1990’s were unable to remove the specter of energy 
shortages. While sustainable economic growth was back, pushing energy consumption 
to increase rapidly, investments in the energy sector remained lagging behind. At the 
beginning this decade (2001), Brazil faced a severe shortage in the supply of electricity 
that forced industry to reduce its output. This time the energy shortage became dramatic 
because of the maturity of the system that had completed the link between the  four 
power systems, South-Southeast-North-Northeast. 
To remove the specter of energy shortages, government decided to  get large 
control on the wholesale power market. New regulations were introduced that gives 
government close monitoring of the development of power system but the specter of 
energy shortages was not fully removed, especially after the Brazilian imports of energy 5 
 
from neighbor countries (Paraguay – hydropower – and Bolivia– natural gas –) became 
a political issue.  
The recent discoveries of very large offshore hydrocarbons fields in a period of 
high oil prices generated strong optimism among Brazilian authorities about the future 
supply  of  energy.  Government  is  envisaging  institutional  and  regulatory  changes, 
especially in the oil sector, that should enhance the fiscal flow to the Treasury. Plenty of 
energy resources, Brazil is in a privileged position to move along the transition from 
fossil fuels to renewable sources of energy, a major comparative advantage in a world 
that has to cope with the climate change issue. However, it is important to have in mind 
that the institutional and regulatory arrangements are a critical piece in the development 
of the energy system. If these arrangements are unable to attract financial resources to 
invest in the system, the energy resources will remain in the ground and will remain 
under with the specter of energy shortages whenever economic growth get momentum. 
 
 
2.2.  Statistical overview 
The historical summary presented above can be indentified in the historical data. 
Energy supply in Brazil can be characterized by three remarkable changes over the past 
70 years. First, the replacement of non-commercial fuel (wood and coal) to economic 
energy sources such as electricity and oil. This movement was particularly acute up to 
the mid 1970´s, where the thrust of the industrialization
2 and urbanization process took 
place. The substitution of wood had positive impacts, given the poor efficiency of wood 
and its heavy environmental costs. In addition, Second, a strong, albeit irregular, move 
towards  renewable resources over time, with sharp reductions in wood use , namely 
sugarcane products (ethanol) and  hydraulic power. Hydraulic power was the chosen 
source  for  power  generation  in the state energy planning from the 1950´s, taking 
advantage of the favorable river basins conditions, particularly in the rich southeast, and 
to lesser the dependency in imported oil. Ethanol received heavy incentives after the oil 
shocks as an alternative for gasoline (transportation) In 1965 while hydraulic po wer 
generated about 5% of all  internal energy supply, it accounted for more than 15% in 
















                                                           
2  Emerging  manufacturing  in  Brazil  used  wood  for  energy  generating,  since  the  early  stages  of 
industrialization (Branstrom, 2005). 6 
 
Figure 1 – Internal Energy Supply Structure, 1940-2007 
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Figure 2 – Sector Composition of Energy Demand, 1970-2007 
 
Source: BEN (2007). 
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It should be noted that oil use increased dramatically over the period, due to 
different  rationales.  Oil  based  fuels  replaced  wood  and  charcoal  in  a  much  more 
efficient way and they were irreplaceable in the transportation sector. As the economy 
grew, energy use in manufacturing rose particularly fast (figure 2). From 1970 to 1980, 
manufacturing share of the total energy consumption rose 10% from 28% to 38%. of all 
energy used. Energy consumption in transportation followed a similar trend. The share 
of energy used among householders diminished mainly as result of the fact that the 
wood used has been replaced with commercial energy sources (electricity and fuel), that 
are much more efficient
3. It is remarkable the increase of  energy use in the energy 
sector. This is largely a result of a growing share of the use sugar cane to produce 
ethanol
4.  
The third structural change in the energy balance was the significant reduction in 
dependency of energy imports (table 1). While in 1970, 27% of Brazilian energy needs 
were imported, in 2007 this figure was below 10%. This outcome is largely the result of 
a substantial increase in the domestic production of oil. Recently, the  country reached 
oil self sufficiency, although oil imports are still necessary due to the quality of the fuels 
needed to feed the  domestic refineries. Brazil should become a net  oil exporter in the 
coming years. 
 
Table 1- Energy External Dependency – Brazil - 1970-2007 
Year  Energy 
Oil and  
Natural Gas 
Coal  Electricity 
1970  27.1  67.6  50.2  0.0 
1975  39.9  79.8  57.9  0.1 
1980  42.6  83.0  52.6  -0.2 
1985  20.1  43.1  48.3  1.0 
1990  25.2  43.4  69.6  10.6 
1995  30.2  49.0  72.0  11.4 
2000  22.2  27.1  68.1  11.3 
2005  10.2  -0.1  71.6  8.8 
2007  8.0  0.1  73.5  8.0 
Source BEN 2007 
Note: Dependency=(Total Demand – Domestic Supply), as % of Total Demand 
 
The careful reader may have noticed the increase of imported electricity in the 
1990. Electricity imports are due to Itaipu, a large dam (12 600 MW capacity), built as a 
joint  project  between Paraguay  (50%) and  Brazil (50%) on the Paraná river. Brazil 
                                                           
3 It may be the case that the sector use shares are being unduly influenced by energy use imputation, 
particularly for wood. This has been pointed out as a limitation to BEN statistics (De Oliveira and 
Gutierrez, 1998). 
4 Sugar cane produces large amounts of the bagasse that is used in the ethanol producing plants. 8 
 
consumes  most  of  Paraguay´s  energy  share  in  the  plant  output,  thus  registered  as 
imports.  
Since the 1990´s there have been increases in the use of fossil fuels for power 
generation (Figures 3 and 4). From 1950´s to the 1980´s, the supply of hydropower 
plants increased steadily. This period represents Eletrobras (and before that state firms 
such as Furnas and Chesf) heyday. During the 1990´s the construction of large dams 
came to a halt due to environmental concerns, but also as result of the economic crisis 
that kept energy demand growing at a relatively slow pace.  
 
Figure 3 – Evolution of Hydropower Supply – 1954-2007 
 
Source: www.ipeadata.gov.br, From Eletrobras data. 
 
The new institutional arrangement of the mid 1990´s led private investors to 
focus their attention on thermalpower plants (induced also by relatively cheap natural 
gas supply from Bolivia). The hydropower capacity growth averaged 13% in the 1970´s 
but fell to below 5% since 1990.  
One major limitation of hydropower is its exposition to precipitation rates. In 
case  of  below  average  precipitation,  the  hydropower  plant  has  limited  generation 
capacity and this has a direct effect on the system availability. Hydropower systems 
have to operate with a certain level of thermal power installed capacity to avoid the risk 












Figure 4 - Hydropower capacity growth - 1960-2007 
 
Source: www.ipeadata.gov.br, From Eletrobras data. 
 
After  the  1990´s  reform,  the  electric  system  was  built  basically  around  two 
economic  players:  state  hydraulic  energy  generators  and  private  thermal  energy 
operators. The latter would provide energy based on reservoir conditions of hydropower 
plants. When the energy available in the reservoir were unable to avoid a certain risk of 
power shortage, thermal power plants would light up and produce the additional power 
needed to supply demand. Given the lack of thermal power expansion in the 1990´s, the 
risk of power shortage increased continually in that period, culminating into the power 
shortage of 2001. 
 
 
3. Economic Growth and Energy Consumption 
 
In Brazil there are many studies that measure the GDP elasticity of electricity 
consumption. Their results  indicate that  the manufacturing  sector demand is  elastic, 
while household consumption is inelastic (Schmidt and Lima, 2004, e.g.). This would 
suggest that the supply of electricity must increase faster than income to keep up with 
demand, at least for manufacturing, so not to avoid energy price increases or actual 
blackouts. 
We  propose  a  broader  view,  estimating  a  model  for  measuring  the  GDP 
elasticity of energy consumption. There are many sources of energy, and over time there 
may be substitution effects due to technological changes or relative price shocks. Hence, 
focusing  only  on  de  GDP  demand  of  one  source  of  energy  (namely,  electricity), 
provides a limited view of the issue.  
We associate an energy hurdle to growth if the energy income demand elasticity 
is greater than one. In this case, energy supply must increase faster than GDP, to avoid 
shortages.  
Our modelling recognizes the dual role of energy in GDP. First, energy is an 
intermediary input and final consumption good. This leads to the use of a system of 
equations, where GDP level and energy use are jointly determined. The time series 
model use will be a Vector Auto-Regressive (VAR) model, namely. 
Yt=01+11 Yt-1 +12 Et-1 + v1t 10 
 
Et= 02+21 Yt-1 +22 Et-1 + v2t 
 
where Yt and Et represent log GDP (in constant prices) and log energy use (in tep, or 
other  energy  units),  respectively.  Shocks  to  GDP  and  energy  use  are  modeled  as  a 
jointly Normal vector of possibly correlated error terms (v1t, v2t). 
  The above specification does not lend itself to the identification of the long run 
energy consumption to  GDP elasticity. At the  same time, we consider the long-run 
relationship between the variables that suggest the existence of a co-integration vector 
between the two non-stationary variables
5. Under co-integration, the above VAR model 
can be written as a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM):  
Yt=01+1 ut-1 + v1t 
Et= 02+2 ut-1 + v2t 
ut-1=Et-1 – 0 – 1 Yt-1 
The long run elasticity of energy demand is given by 1. (Enders, 2004 and others). 
  Last,  but  not  least,  energy  demand  differs  across  sectors  (manufacturing, 
agriculture and services). If GDP growth over time is followed by structural changes we 
should  expect  a  changing  demand  elasticity  and  a  structural  break  in  the  estimated 
relationship. While this can lead to non-cointegration, we specifically test for changes in 
the co-integration vector.  
   The variables used are GDP in constant prices, obtained from  ipeadata, and 
energy production in Brazil, obtained from the Energy Balance (Balanço Energético 
Nacional, BEN, 2008), from the Ministry of Energy. Energy production is measured in 
tep (oil equivalent tones), to allow aggregation of different energy types. We consider 
only commercial energy sources (oil derived, natural gás, coal, alcohol, electricity), as 
these are less prone to imputation errors in BEN and are the relevant energy supply 
sources for policy. Our sample covers from 1970 to 2007. 
There  is  co-integration  among  the  variables  with  the  long  run  co-integration 
vector,  estimated  from  the  vector  error  correction  form  for  a  VAR(1)  model  with 
unconstrained constant
6. The long run equation (co-integration relationship), is given by 
(standard errors in parenthesis) 
Ln(Energy) = 11.38 + 1.6045 Ln(GDP) 
         (0.0706) 
 
Imposing the restriction that the energy demand is elastic yields a p-value of 
0.0091, rejecting the hypothesis at the 1% level. Thus, there is evidence that the Energy 
demand is elastic. At the same time, there is clear endogeneity between the variables, as 
the estimated VECM has both adjustment coefficients significant, suggesting Granger 
causality from GDP to Energy and from Energy to GDP.  Table 2 has the details: 
The endogeneity of Energy and GDP precludes any objective impulse response 
analysis, to evaluate the most significant feedback effect, as the decomposition ordering 
influences the result. Nevertheless, such effects are illustrated using Pesaran and Shin 
(2001) Generalized Impulses. The impulse response of each variable to one standard 
deviation changes is presented in Figure 6 below. The most relevant information comes 
                                                           
5 Variables non-stationarity was tested using standard Dickey-Fuller tests, available upon request. They 
are not presented to save space. 
6 The deterministic term selected was indicated by the Schwartz criteria. 11 
 
from the off diagonal graphs. In the upper right graph, we see that the effect of a one 
standard deviation percentage growth in GDP yields a decreasing 2% growth in demand 
per year in the first year, with negative effects after a decade. The lower left graph 
presents the effect a one standard deviation percentage growth in energy demand on 
GDP. This effect is similar at a 2% growth in the first year, but converging to the value 
of 1.6% per year.  The larger multiplicative effect of Energy on GDP suggests that the 
sector has important linkages with the rest of the economy. 
 
Table 2 - Error Correction model for Energy and GDP – Brazil 1970-2007 
  Ln(Energy)  Ln(GDP) 
     
      Cointegration vector   0.20708*   0.18944* 
   (0.03992)   (0.03870) 
Constant   0.046087*   0.039366* 
   (0.00536)   (0.00520) 
     
       R-squared   0.244535   0.533764 
 F-statistic   11.32909   40.06933 
System Log Likehood                            166.3054 
     
      Source: authors calculations based on data from BEN and ipeadata 
Note: * - indicates significant at 1% level. 
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Source: authors´calculations, based on Table 2 estimates. 
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  One concern over the estimates is that structural change in GDP may be biasing 
the  results.  In  the  1970´s,  while  manufacturing  share  of  GDP  was  about  33%,  and 
agriculture  18%,  by  2007,  manufacturing  only  accounted  for  18%  of  GDP  and  the 
agriculture share fell to 5%. Given the known elasticity differences between sectors, 
may be biasing elasticity estimates. 
To overcome this, we estimate two VEC models, for the 19701-1985 and 1986-
2007 periods. The periods were chosen to accommodate the large structural changes in 
the economy (1985 is the end of the II PND development plan and the start of the near 
hyperinflation crises) and minimum sample sizes for econometric analysis.  
 
Table 3 – Structural change in energy demand elasticitities. 
  Ln(Energy)  Ln(Energy) 
     
      Ln(GDP)   1.289572*   0.930318* 
  (0.03067)  (0.19163) 
     
Constant   -6.907*   -1.739* 
     
       Log-Lik.   65.67094   114.0948 
Unit elasticity test 
 (p-value)  0.0002  0.8116 
Sample  1970-1985  1986-2007 
     
      Source: authors calculations based on data from BEN and ipeadata 
Note: * - indicates significant at 1% level. 
 
Focusing on cointegrating vectors, the GDP elasticity falls over time, as expected, given 
the fall in the share of manufacturing (an energy intensive sector) on GDP. While the 
elasticity for the period 1970-1985 is statistically greater than 1, we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that the energy elasticity in the second period is equal to one. 
 
A Likelihood Ratio test for structural change over the period yield a statistic of 
26.92. Under a chi-square with 12 degrees of freedom, the 1 and 5% critical values are 
21.02 and 26.22, respectively. The test clearly rejects the coeffients stability over time. 
 
In  sum,  the  recent  Brazilian  experience  indicates  that  Energy  demand  was 
elastic, but it has become unit elastic over time, due to the change in the GDP structure. 
Multiplicative effects from the energy demand seem to be larger than demand effects of 
GDP on this sector. In other words, not only Energy is a required input for value added, 
but  its  effect  is  larger  than  the  demand  increase  from  income  growth.  Providing  a 
consistent, sustainable energy supply may have direct and positive effects on economic 
growth in Brazil. While the energy restriction steaming from an elastic energy demand 
seems to be weakening, supply must grow at pace of GDP to avoid energy shortages. 
Such supply hinges on tackling a number of weaknesses in the current Energy 
Supply Model for Brazil. Namely: the role of Natural Gas, the role of Petrobras and pre-
salt oil exploration and production, the extent of renewable fuels for automobile and 
power  generation  and  the  electricity  supply  at  reasonable  costs.  This  requires  the 13 
 
discussion of the current regulatory framework for the main energy sources: electricity 
and oil. 
 
4. Regulatory changes and challenges for the XXI Century. 
 
From 1995 to 2000, there were significant changes in the regulatory framework 
of  energy  markets  in  Brazil,  including  constitutional  amendments,  as  well  as 
privatization of state enterprises, particularly in electricity distribution. These changes 
altered the roles of private and public players and one may argue that the regulatory 
changes effects have not been completely absorbed. Before discussing possible changes 
to the current regime, it is important to present briefly the current regulatory framework. 
 
4.1 – Electricity Markets 
 
Until the 1990s, the electricity sector in Brazil was based on State property. 
Companies had monopoly of regional markets and decisions regarding the sector were 
concentrated at Eletrobrás, the federal government’s holding. With few exceptions, the 
federal government was the owner of the generation and transmission assets whereas the 
states held the distribution ones. 
The 1990s reform meant to broaden the private participation in the Brazilian 
electricity sector and to introduce incentives to efficiency, mainly through liberalization 
of  electricity  generation.  Following  the  international  experience  of  electric  sectors 
reforms,  an  independent  regulatory  agency  (Aneel)  was  established  as  well  as  an 
independent operator of the system (ONS) and a wholesale energy market (MAE). 
The  privatization  process  started  in  1995.  23  State  owned  companies  of  the 
electric sector were sold, which led to US$ 22 billions of revenue (Losekann, 2003). 
The privatization process has moved deep forward in distribution, but has faced many 
challenges in generation. Only four generation companies (three state owned and one 
federal owned) were privatized. Adding this up with the investments on new plants the 
private share in the generation market is of 20%
7. 
Even before the transition to the competitive model was completed, Brazil faced 
a major crisis in electricity supply. Since the late 1990s the level of storage in the hydro-
electric reservoirs has progressively diminished and it reached critical levels in  2001. 
On May 2001, the government rationed 20% of the electricity consumption in the sub-
systems of the Southeast/Mid-West and Northeast. The rationing lasted until May 2002. 
The consumption of electricity was drastically reduced, resulting in major economic 
consequences. The estimated social cost of the rationing was close to 3% of the  GDP 
(Sauer et al., 2003). 
The second reform aimed at avoiding a new supply crisis with a concurrent rise 
of electricity prices. In 2004, the new regulatory framework re-established the planning 
role of the State and drastically altered the wholesale market. 
The Energy Research Company (EPE, in Portuguese) was created to assist the 
Energy Minister in sector planning, playing an important role at the expansion auctions. 
It was decreed that all energy trade must be carried out by long-term contracts. The only 
function of the short-term market (Chamber of Electric Energy Trade  – CCEE) is to 
correct  imbalances  between  contracted  supply  and  demand.  Agents  that  are 
                                                           
7 In the distribution activity, private share is about 60%. 14 
 
systematically  exposed  to  this  market  (contract  less  than  necessary)  are  subject  to 
financial penalties. 
Two  trade  environments  were  created  in  the  wholesale  market:  regulated 
contracting (ACR) and free contracting (ACL). At the ACR, distribution companies buy 
energy in public auctions. They submit demand projections in a five-year horizon to 
EPE. Based on those projections, EPE sets the total market that will be offered in the 
auctions.  
The model distinguishes the energy coming from already existing plants (“old 
energy”)  from  the  energy  coming  from  the  new  ones  (“new  energy”),  both  being 
negotiated in the ACR in different ways. The old energy was intended to respond to the 
existing market. In 2004 and 2005 four auctions negotiated the major part of old energy.  
As they took place in a moment of excess of supply due to consumption decrease after 
the rationing, the resulting energy prices were around half of the long run marginal cost 
(Losekann and De Oliveira, 2007). 
Since December 2005, nine energy auctions have been carried out to set the 
expansion  of  the  generating  system.  Hydro  and  thermo  power  plants  were  treated 
differently.  Whereas  the  hydropower  plants  compete  with  prices  for  the  generated 
energy, the thermoelectric plants bid for the generating capacity. The operational cost of 
thermoelectric plants that won the auctions is passed over to the final consumers. 
The  lower  prices  of  old  energy  allows  a  smooth  transition  to  higher  energy 
prices  as  new  energy  increases  its  share  on  ACR  total  sales.  Nevertheless,  any 
unanticipated need to run thermoelectric plants can change this trend and may cause a 
sudden rise on energy prices.  
The second electricity reform did not address the main challenge of the Brazilian 
electricity system: coordination between the power sector and the natural gas industry 
(Losekann and Oliveira, 2008). The dispatch rules of the power sector propose very low 
average operating rates for the thermalpower plants but ask these plants to be fully 
dispatched when rain precipitation is short. This arrangement is financially costly for 
the infant natural gas industry. The gas that should be available for thermal power plants 
is often diverted to other consumers instead.  
Indeed, natural gas fuelled power plants are not participating in energy auctions. 
This situation gave opportunity to oil fuelled plants in the energy auctions.  
 
4.2 – Oil Markets 
 
By the end of Second World War, Brazil was amid a wave of nationalization in 
the face of increasing capital and energy imports driven by its development needs. The 
need to secure oil supplies fostered intense debate over the development of a national oil 
industry,  reaching  the  1954  campaign  of  “O  Petróleo  é  Nosso”  [Oil  belongs  to 
Brazilians]. Law 2004/1953 constituted Petrobras, a state enterprise that would explore, 
develop, produce and refine oil as a State Monopoly. The 2004/1953 Law declared all 
stages of the oil industry state monopolies but retail. 
The rationale for a state enterprise was to guarantee control over resources, and 
foster an industry with strong internalized forward linkages and multiplicative effects 
over the economy. From the 1950´s until the 1990´s Petrobras is recognized as playing 
its  role  as  inductor  of  the  Brazilian  infrastructure  and  base  manufacturing,  both  in 
production, refinery and chemicals. Yet, by the 1970´s other energy sources received 
heavy government subsidies and incentives, to counteract the oil crisis effects, namely 
ethanol  (álcool  hidratado).  Ethanol  was  used  added  to  gasoline,  reducing  pollution 15 
 
emissions from led, and as fuel itself. In 1986 about 90% of new automobiles sold were 
ethanol fuelled. Yet in 1990 there were shortages that shattered consumer confidence on 
ethanol supply. Changes in relative prices for sugar and domestic price controls are 
usually pointed out as shortages culprits. 
By the mid 1990´s there was a belief in the government that state enterprises, 
including Petrobras, did not have the financial stature to lead the development process 
in Brazil. The political mood for less state intervention induced regulatory reform across 
the oil sector. A Constitutional Amendment (EC nº 9, 9/Nov/1995) allowed a New Oil 
Law (9478/97) that regulated Article n 177 of the Constitution. 
The  Constitutional  Amendment  did  not  end  the  State  monopoly  over  oil 
resources but allowed the State to franchise enterprises to operate at any stage of the oil 
industry, under a variety of contract conditions.
8 A regulatory entity (ANP
9 -Agência 
Nacional  do  Petroleo,  Gás  Natural  e  Biocombustíveis)  was  created  to  oversee  and 
regulate  the  sector  activities.  Companies  were  offered  the  possibility  to  bid  for 
concessions to explore oil and natural gas
10. In the concession regime, firms bear the 
risk associated with exploration and production, but own the extracted oil. The state 
compensated by royalties, taxes and other fiscal mechanisms. ANP is responsible for the 
concessions auctions.  
ANP has so far carried out nine auctions (called “rounds”) with varying degrees 
of success. The table below presents a summary of the rounds. 
The sharp decrease in the auction success ratio (conceded/auctioned blocks) may 
be attributed to two factors. First, a change in the “block” definition, from a rectangular, 
large area form (about 200x800kms) to a “exploratory cell” definition (used in the Gulf 
of Mexico). Second, a large portion of land blocks, that are known to have less oil and 
lower success ratio than deepsea blocks. 
Later, in the eve of the Ninth Round (November, 2007), ANP withdrew from the 
auction 41 blocks neighboring the Tupi Oil Field. This was the Oil Field where pre-salt 
layer oil was found, on extremely deep waters and soil deeps, but with enormous output 
potential of high quality oil. (e.g. Petrobras, 2007).  
The  official  argument  was  that  the  new  discoveries  open  a  new  ground  for 
production,  with  little  risk  involved,  as  well  as  significant  risk  of    different  blocks 
sharing the same oil field. To avoid the “commons tragedy” of overexploitation of any 
block by the aggressive companies, unitization of concessions is the usual solution in 
the oil business. While there are international experiences in solving the unitization 
problem, there is very little experience on this issue among Brazilian authorities
11 
 
                                                           
8 Actually, in the 1970´s other firms could explore and produce oil according to the “contraltos de risco” 
(risk service contracts), but with limited success and interest from other firms. (Campos, 2005). 
9 Law 11097 (Jan 13, 2005), included biofuels under ANP´s scope. 
10 Other types of state-firm contracts, with special emphasis for Latin America can be reviewed in 
Palacios (2002). 
11 Actually, there is only one unitization agreement signed as of writting of this paper, between Aurizônia 
Petróleos e a Petrobras, on output individualization of the Lorena Field (BT-POT-10) at Rio Grande do 
Norte. It is known that there are other unitization issues under analysis at ANP: Petrobras and Total on 
block BC-2; Petrobras and Shell on block BC-10, and El Paso and Queiroz Galvão on BM-CAL-4 





Round 1  Round 2  Round 3  Round 4  Round 5  Round 6  Round 7  Round 9 
1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2007 
Auctioned Blocks  27  23  53  54  908  913  1.134  271 
Auctioned  Area 
(Km²)  132.178  59.271  89.823  144.106  162.392  202.739  397.600  73.079 
Avg.  Block  Size 
(Km²)  4.895  2.577  1.695  2.669  179  222  351  270 
Conceded Area  54.660  48.074  48.629  25.289  21.951  39.657  171.007  45.329 
Conceded Blocks  12  21  34  21  101  154  240  108 
Conceded/Auctioned 
Blocks 
44,4%  91,3%  64,2%  38,9%  11,1%  16,9%  21,2%  39,9% 
Source: Alvite et al. (2008). 
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Nevertheless,  the  potentially  enormous  Pre-Salt  reserves  prompted  Federal  Government 
officials to question the concession framework, that gives away the oil property, once extracted, 
echoing “O Petroleo é Nosso” arguments. While “previous contracts will not be broken” according 
to the Energy Minister E. Lobão (Zacconi, 2008), a new regulatory framework is being drafted.  
While  pre-salt  reserves  are  indeed  significant,  and  may  increase  by  at  least  200%  the 
Brazilian Oil and Natural Gas reserves, its cost and technical difficulties are of equal stature. In 
addition,  there  is  the  oil  price  uncertainty  to  render  economic  exploration  a  real  challenge. 
Regulatory uncertainty may push the area development many years forward.  
Under current rules, Petrobras estimates that the Tupi field will be operational only after by 
2012 or 2015. It must be noted that the Tupi field was auctioned in the second round, back in 1999. 
Although future time lags should decrease there was almost a decade of exploratory effort to reach 
the Pre-Salt oil, and the financial resources required to actually exploit its reserves are substantial. 






In the past 50 years Brazil experienced radical changes in its energy sector. The energy 
matrix changed radically. There is now (in 2009) widespread use of commercial energy sources, 
such  as  electricity  and  oil  products  replacing  wood  and  charcoal.  New  energy  sources  were 
introduced, namely, natural gas and ethanol. External dependency was sharply reduced with the 
maturity of the oil industry in the country and the discovery of large oil fields in the continental 
shelf.  Renewable  resources  are  currently  the  main  source  of  energy,  either  sugar  cane  derived 
ethanol or hydraulic power generation. 
These changes reflected the effort to ease the energy restrictions to growth in the Brazilian 
economy, as discussed in the first section. Such restrictions were acute in the XX Century given the 
elastic  income  demand  elasticity  of  energy  consumption.  Energy  needs  up  to  the  1980´s  were 
growing  faster  than  GDP,  as  expected  in  a  development  process  with  industrialization  and 
urbanization. 
Currently these energy restrictions have eased to the extent that the income elasticity of 
energy  consumption  has  lowered  and  is  estimated  to  be  either  proportional  to  income  or  even 
inelastic. This places a lesser burden on the energy supply growth rate for the coming years. 
Nevertheless, the 2001 power rationing in most of the country made clear that energy supply 
must be secure to play a positive role in the Brazilian economic growth. Electricity supply is still 
very reliant on hydrology, with price shocks for consumers from the almost continuous use of 
thermal power plants  during dry periods. And recent  political  changes  have limited the supply 
expansion of natural gas. Supply restrictions have been reported in October 2007. These facts raise 
the issue of the state of the current regulatory regime for the energy sector. 
The regulatory regime changed significantly over the past ten years, with pro-market based 
reforms with arguably varying degrees of success. The reforms, reviewed in the second section, 
focusing on two main energy sources, electricity and oil, the first still struggles with hydrology risks 
and have not recovered previous investment levels. The second is on the eve of a radically different 
scenario,  both  technologically  and  economically,  given  the  “pre-salt”  oil  bearing  discovered 
reserves off the coast of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo at very deep waters. 
Brazil is currently in a unique situation. On one hand it has large energy resources, both 
renewable and non-renewable. Its hydraulic resources have not been fully exploited. Its ethanol 
sector is the most efficient in the world and has been producing with some excess capacity. Its oil 18 
 
reserves have risen significantly and should at least double in the next years. Energy could be a 
growth inducer, as the country starts to export energy (oil and ethanol) to other countries. 
On  the  other  hand,  resource  availability  itself  does  not  guarantee  energy  supply.  This 
requires  a  consistent  regulatory  framework  for  the  whole  energy  sector.  Whether  it  implies  a 
renewed state participation as an energy producer and distributor, much like the 1960´s and 1970´s 
is an open issue. The past regulatory regimes must be evaluated recognizing the current and future 
resource availability, environmental and economic constraints and the integrated energy system for 
the XXI Century. 
In conclusion, Brazil is in a privileged position to move along the transition from fossil fuels 
to renewable sources of energy, a major comparative advantage in a world that has to cope with the 
climate change issue. However, it is important to have in mind that the institutional and regulatory 
arrangements are a critical piece in the development of the energy system. If these arrangements are 
unable to attract financial resources to invest in the system, the energy resources will remain in the 
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